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Published research and other material relating principally to naval history, naval arms control and warship transfers.
A Naval History of Interwar Naval Arms Control
PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2017.
Abstract: The attempt by the major powers between 1918 and 1939 to negotiate the limitation of naval armaments was an unparalleled experiment in the management of global military power and a significant feature of the interwar diplomatic landscape. Naval arms control dominated the naval policies, strategies, and programs of the major naval powers and, by controlling the types, quantities and design of the warships available at the start of the Second World War, shaped the maritime warfare environment at a critical period in history. The interwar naval arms control process represents the most extensive historical case study of conventional arms control available for analysis. Although there has been extensive research on various aspects of interwar naval arms control, literature by political historians has generally failed to address the detailed technical nature of this topic and contains numerous errors, which has impacted the lessons learned from the process. Naval historical literature, on the other hand, has generally treated the detail of naval arms control anecdotally or tangentially, at best, generally within the context of discussing specific warships or types, and often with significant misunderstandings that again undermine conclusions. There has therefore been a need for an account that corrects the historical record and integrates detailed research into the naval aspects of the negotiations. This study draws primarily on archival sources to establish a thorough record of interwar naval arms control from the perspective of a naval historian. It both corrects factual errors and notable errors of omission in existing works concerning the topic, and re-evaluates the lessons to be learned from this experience. The thesis concludes that qualitative naval limitation was easier to negotiate than quantitative because it generally did not materially impact on a nation’s ability to defend itself, or on matters of national pride or prestige. It was possible to generate win-win agreements that provided economic benefits to all parties, prevented qualitative competition, and promoted stability. Quantitative limitation was more complex, and was only really practicable when there was a genuine lack of hostility, and no real desire for competition between the parties.
Western Naval History Association Newsletter, Vol. 7 No. 1, Summer 2026, pp11-12.
Abstract: In 1931, Australia gifted its two new submarines - HMAS Oxley and HMAS Otway - to Great Britain. This short article explores why Australia decided to abandon its recently acquired submarine capability, and why Britain accepted the gift at a time of severely constrained finances.
The Chough, Spring 2026, pp. 16-18.
Abstract: HMS Hood was originally intended to be fitted with eight above-water torpedo tubes, but concerns regarding the vulnerability of the warheads, together with the opportunity to use the weight for additional armour, resulted in their removal from the design during construction, although four were temporarily retained. Proposals were subsequently made to retain these permanently and to restore the other four tubes. By this time, however, the Washington Naval Treaty restricted the extent to which retained capital ships could be reconstructed, and the proposals raised questions as to whether the additional tubes could be fitted without breaching the Treaty. This article uses Admiralty records to trace the various proposals concerning Hood's above-water torpedo armament and the extent to which the Washington Naval Treaty affected the decisions that were made.
The Washington Naval Conference, 1922
Part 1, The Chough, Spring 2022, pp21-22; Part 2, Summer 2022, pp21-22; and Part 3, Winter 2022, pp14-16.
Abstract: Published in three instalments to mark the centenary of the Washington Naval Treaty, this article provides an account of the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference and the circumstances that led to it. It describes the naval competition that preceded the Conference, particularly the American 1916 building programme and the Japanese 8-8 programme, together with the differing strategic and political requirements of the participating powers. The negotiations covered capital ship ratios, the building holiday, disposal of existing and projected warships, replacement arrangements and qualitative restrictions. The resulting agreements substantially altered the composition and future development of the major navies, and established the framework within which Hood and the other surviving capital ships operated for much of the interwar period.
Argonauta, Vol. 38, No. 1, Winter 2021, pp. 20-21.
Abstract: Article XVIII of the Washington Naval Treaty prohibited the signatories from disposing of warships in circumstances where they might become vessels of war in a foreign navy. A question concerning the application of this provision arose in 1930-31 when the former US cruisers Charleston and Huron were sold to the Powell River Company in Canada. Both ships had been substantially dismantled and were intended for use as floating breakwaters rather than as warships. This article describes the consultations between the United States and the other Treaty powers over the proposed sales.
Warship International, Vol. 58, No. 3, September 2021, pp. 193-198.
Abstract: During the late 1920s renewed Greek and Turkish naval construction threatened to develop into an expensive regional naval arms race at a time when neither country was particularly well placed to afford one. The Greece-Turkey Naval Protocol of 30 October 1930 attempted to address this problem without imposing numerical or qualitative limitations on either navy. Instead, each government agreed to provide six months' notice before ordering, acquiring or constructing warships or naval armaments, providing an opportunity for consultation before the other country considered it necessary to respond. The Protocol formed part of the wider improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey during this period, and provides an interesting example of the use of a relatively simple confidence-building measure to control naval competition.
Naval History, Vol. 35, No. 1, February 2021, p. 4.
Abstract: The 1930 London Naval Treaty exempted certain small vessels from its limitations, provided that they did not exceed a speed of 20 knots. An earlier account attributed the change from a proposed limit of 18 knots to 20 knots to Admiral Pratt of the United States Navy. Contemporary conference records and subsequent testimony before the US Senate indicate instead that the 20-knot figure was proposed by Japan and subsequently accepted by the United States. This short research note examines the available evidence to clarify the origin of a minor provision of the 1930 London Naval Treaty.
Warship International, Vol. 57, No. 3, September 2020, pp. 197-198.
Abstract: Attempts to project the limitations of the 1936 London Naval Treaty onto Scandinavian countries created an issue for those nations, whose requirements for coast-defence ships fell within the gap between cruisers and capital ships that the Treaty was intended to prohibit. This article describes Britain’s attempts to negotiate an arrangement with Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland that would permit construction of vessels suited to their requirements while maintaining a reasonably consistent system of qualitative limitation. The agreement did not achieve general ratification, although Scandinavian construction plans immediately before World War II largely remained within the limits that had been negotiated. [Note - due to a publishing error, this article was printed with an incorrect title. The intended title was “The Anglo-Scandinavian Naval Agreement - 1938”.]
Warships, No. 200, December 2020, pp. 92-95.
Abstract: Mexico made several attempts during the interwar period to acquire second-hand United States warships, including efforts during the 1923-24 rebellion to obtain former US destroyers and other vessels. These proposals raised questions concerning American obligations under the Washington Naval Treaty. During the 1930s Brazil and Argentina also showed interest in acquiring Omaha-class cruisers as these ships approached the point where they might become surplus to US Navy requirements. This article describes these proposals and the difficulties encountered in attempting to reconcile them with American naval and foreign policy.
Warships, No. 199, July 2020, pp. 40-42.
Abstract: A number of foreign warships and small combatants were transferred to the opposing Spanish naval forces during the Spanish Civil War. These included German S-boats, Italian destroyers, submarines and motor torpedo boats, and Soviet motor torpedo boats supplied to Nationalist or Republican Spain. This article identifies the vessels concerned and describes the circumstances and timing of their transfer, with reference to the naval arms control agreements that might have applied.
Warships, No. 198, March 2020, pp. 41-44, with Dr D. Stoker.
Abstract: During the 1920s France attempted to dispose of the obsolete cruisers D'Entrecasteaux and Desaix, but the Washington Naval Treaty's restrictions on the transfer of warships to non-signatory powers complicated the process. D'Entrecasteaux was initially loaned to Belgium for use as a floating barracks and was later transferred to Poland. Polish interest in acquiring Desaix resulted in more prolonged negotiations, and no transfer was eventually made. This article describes the negotiations and the uncertainty that existed over the application of the Treaty to old warships that had been disarmed or demilitarised.
World Ship Society: Warships, No. 197, November 2019, pp. 12-15.
Abstract: The former Royal Navy minesweeper HMS Havant was sold to Siam in 1922-23, ostensibly for use as a training ship. The transaction nevertheless raised questions under Article XVIII of the Washington Naval Treaty, which prohibited the transfer of vessels in circumstances where they might become warships in a foreign navy. Britain relied on assurances from the Siamese Government that Havant would only be used for training, while the United States questioned whether the proposed sale was compatible with the Treaty. The ship subsequently served for many years in the Siamese and Thai Navy as Chao Phya and was eventually armed. Its later service therefore makes the original transfer difficult to reconcile with a strict interpretation of Article XVIII.
World Ship Society: Warships, No. 196, August 2019, pp. 12-17.
Abstract: In 1937 the Roosevelt Administration proposed that surplus US destroyers should be made available on lease to Latin American republics possessing naval forces. The proposal was intended to improve hemispheric relationships while providing the smaller navies with relatively inexpensive training vessels. Argentina strongly opposed the scheme on strategic, legal and regional arms-race grounds, while Britain raised questions concerning its compatibility with the 1936 London Naval Treaty. Opposition eventually prevented the proposal from proceeding. This article describes the development of the scheme and the diplomatic and arms control problems that it encountered.
Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol. 28, No. 1, Autumn 2002.
Abstract: Written following the 2001 Tampa incident, this article considers the extent to which Australia's international legal obligations constrained measures intended to prevent people smuggling by sea. It examines the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1951 Refugee Convention, including the different powers available in the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and on the high seas. It also considers the prohibition on returning refugees to places of persecution, Australia's handling of the Tampa asylum seekers, and the legislative changes that followed. The article concludes that the international conventions placed important constraints on the measures available to Australia, but did not prevent effective action against maritime people smuggling.
Journal of the Australian Defence Colleges Association, June 2002.
Abstract: This essay considers Admiral Jellicoe's performance as an operational commander and leader, with reference to the Battle of Jutland. Criteria for competence in command are developed and applied to three important decisions: the employment of the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships, the deployment of the Grand Fleet after contact was made with the German Fleet, and Jellicoe's decision to turn away from the German destroyer torpedo attack. His leadership is also considered against several contemporary theoretical models. The essay concludes that Jellicoe displayed sound judgement, made timely decisions and exercised an appropriate degree of centralised command.
WW1 Document Archive.
Abstract: This essay considers the performance of German Admiral Souchon during the opening months of World War I, particularly his escape to the Dardanelles with Goeben and Breslau and his subsequent command of Ottoman naval forces. It examines his preparations for war, operational decisions, tactical handling of his squadron and willingness to act independently when circumstances required it. Souchon's role in bringing about hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and Russia is also considered. His combination of careful preparation, political awareness, ruthlessness and willingness to exercise command initiative allowed a comparatively small naval force to have consequences far beyond its immediate military strength.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 June 1994.
Abstract: A report that the proposed sale of US-built submarines to Egypt would represent the first export of submarines constructed in the United States overlooked a number of earlier examples. These included the four Abtao-class submarines built by Electric Boat for Peru during the 1950s, H-class submarines constructed during World War I for the Royal Navy and subsequently transferred in part to Chile and Canada, and two submarines ordered by Chile from the Seattle Construction and Dry Dock Company but acquired by Canada at the outbreak of World War I. This short correspondence identifies these earlier cases and shows that American construction of submarines for foreign customers had a considerably longer history than the original report suggested.
Booklet published in conjunction with the Naval Historical Society of Australia, 2006.
Abstract: This research guide identifies archival and other historical material held in Australia and New Zealand relating to HMS Hood. Much of the material results from Hood's 1924 visit to Australasia as flagship of the Special Service Squadron, while other records concern the four Australians who were lost when the ship was sunk in 1941. The guide covers holdings in the numerous institutions across Australia and New Zealand, together with relevant material held privately. Collection references, descriptions and practical information are provided to assist researchers in locating material dispersed among many repositories.
Conference Papers and Presentations
NSW Military History Society, Sydney, 5 July 2025.
Abstract: The Washington Naval Conference brought together five naval powers whose strategic requirements and political objectives differed considerably. This presentation describes the naval programmes and political pressures that brought them to Washington, before considering the negotiations. It gives particular attention to the compromises required to reach agreement, including the retention of the Japanese battleship Mutsu and the consequential changes to the British and American programmes. The resulting Treaty was not simply an exercise in disarmament, but a negotiated settlement in which each participant accepted restrictions in some areas in return for outcomes that met more important strategic requirements.
McMullin Naval History Symposium, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, 21 September 2023.
Abstract: The Anglo-German Naval Agreements of 1935 and 1937 formed part of the wider interwar naval arms control system rather than being isolated bilateral arrangements. The 1935 Agreement established German naval strength in relation to that of the Royal Navy, and further negotiations were undertaken to integrate Germany into the qualitative limitation system established by the 1936 London Naval Treaty. This presentation considers those negotiations, including the questions of submarine parity and heavy cruisers, together with the parallel discussions with the Soviet Union. The agreements represented a British attempt to place some limits on otherwise uncontrolled German naval rearmament and, where possible, direct German construction towards types and numbers of warships that presented the least danger to British strategic requirements.
Naval and Maritime Power in Two World Wars Conference, Greenwich Maritime Institute, 11 April 2014.
Abstract: Accounts of interwar naval arms control have sometimes drawn a relatively simple distinction between democratic powers that complied with their treaty obligations and revisionist powers that attempted to evade them. This presentation questions that distinction using examples drawn principally from British and American practice. These include the treatment of the aircraft carriers Lexington and Saratoga, declared and actual aircraft-carrier tonnage, disposal and transfer of warships, notification requirements, and the interpretation of standard displacement. The examples show that implementation of the treaties frequently involved innovative interpretations, omissions and practices that stretched formal obligations among governments that ostensibly remained committed to the naval arms control system.
Trafalgar Day Conference, Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 21 October 2005.
Abstract: Anglo-American naval relations changed substantially between the end of World War I and the interwar naval limitation conferences. This presentation considers the rise of American naval power, the origins and revival of the US 1916 building programme, the post-war dispute over naval parity, and the settlement eventually reached at the Washington Naval Conference. It then considers continuing areas of disagreement, particularly battleship modernisation and cruiser strength, which contributed to the difficulties experienced before the 1930 London Naval Conference. Britain and the United States moved during this period from the possibility of serious naval competition towards acceptance of naval parity, although important differences remained over what parity should mean for particular categories of warship and for two navies with very different strategic requirements.
Museum Ship Reports on MuseumShips.us
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