Destroyers for Finland
On 8 November 1920, the Finnish government enquired of Great Britain about the procurement of a destroyer of 1,500 tons, a torpedo boat of 800 tons, and a submarine of 750/900 tons. The British answer was delayed while clarification was sought on the League of Nations position on the possession of submarines by Finland, and it was not until 23 March 1921, nearly five months after Finland’s initial request, that the Admiralty replied. The RN agreed to sell to the Finns as long as they did not want submarines and gave guarantees that the strength of their navy would not exceed the League of Nations limits. As for payment, the Admiralty asked only for an initial advance covering the scrap value of the ships, payable at the time of transfer, with the balance paid in instalments. Unfortunately for the Finns, the Treasury disliked the Admiralty’s plans. Problems with the British Treasury caused nearly a four-month delay in the dispatch of the ship prices and produced a change in payment conditions. Finally, the British offered Marksman class flotilla leaders for £8,000 each and destroyers of the ‘M’ and earlier classes at £4,000. They demanded payment in cash, the Treasury refusing to grant any terms.
After informing the Finns of what vessels they had for sale, the Admiralty informed the Foreign Office that the Navy was now reluctant to authorise the deal, at least for the moment, because of the talks being pursued in Washington
Negotiations for the vessels continued, albeit slowly. In late August 1921, the British agreed to sell two ‘M’ class destroyers. The Finns replied on 19 October 1921 that they wanted to buy six ‘M’ class destroyers, and asked for more details on the vessels and the conditions of sale. On 19 December, the Admiralty offered six destroyers: Llewellyn, Lurcher, Lysander, Lark, Lawford, and Lookout, and invited the Finnish representatives to come and inspect the vessels. Three days later, a Foreign Office official commented that the offered destroyers were apparently of the ‘L’ class because their names began with the letter ‘L’. He stated that the Finns had been ‘deceived’ and recorded that the Admiralty had unofficially admitted that while one department was adding up the value of the ‘M’ class ships, their guns, and fittings, another department had sold the vessels for scrap. The Foreign Office branded the Admiralty response ‘unbusinesslike’ and recorded that the Admiralty answered none of the Finns’ questions regarding the vessels, nor did they mention whether or not the original price was the same for this second group of ships. The Foreign Office decided that the Finns should be informed that the Admiralty had only the ‘L’ class vessels available, and that these should be inspected as formerly proposed. The Finns accepted the offer of the ‘L’ class craft and asked if they could carry out immediate inspections in order to facilitate the transaction. In January 1922, the Finnish government dispatched the head of the Finnish Navy, Commodore von Schoultz, and a civil engineer to inspect the vessels.
While the Finnish inspection team made its way from Helsinki to London, the progress of the Washington Naval talks killed the deal. The Washington Treaties allowed signatories to construct new ships for foreign powers, but forbade the sale of existing vessels. An angry Foreign Office official described this dichotomy as ‘absurd’ and complained that the Admiralty should have notified the Helsinki legation that the Washington naval discussions made the sale to Finland less than certain, thus allowing the Finns to delay sending their inspectors until the situation cleared. The British delegation to the WNC raised the question of sale of surplus warships to non-signatory powers at the naval committee on 25 January, but there was a unanimous expression that such an action would be incompatible with the spirit of the naval treaty to permit such an action pending ratification, and it was therefore resolved, as a matter of honour, that none of the signatory powers would be thus disposed of with effect from 25 January 1922. The Finns were formally advised of the inability to complete the sale on 15 March 1922.
Undaunted by the deal’s sudden collapse, the Finns searched for ways to get around the Treaty. At the end of March, 1922 they mounted another effort to bring about the sale of the once-promised destroyers. The Chief of the Finnish General Staff, at the request of the Finnish President, called upon Rennie and asked him whether or not the sale could go through. The Finnish representative pointed out that the Finnish government had first approached the British in 1920 and that the sale had been agreed to in principle in August 1921. This had been confirmed in December 1921 by a statement made to the Finnish Minister in London. The Finns also pointed out that the increase in the Finnish Navy was not contrary to any League of Nations accords and since the vessels had been offered to Finland prior to the WNC, and this offer confirmed while the Conference still sat, the sale should go through. He went on to inform the British of Finland’s dire need for the ships, stating that the current vessels of the Finnish Navy had ‘no military value’, an assessment not far from the truth. The Finns also insisted that if the sale did not occur, Finland would be forced to purchase vessels elsewhere ‘at far greater cost’. The British remained unmoved and replied that they were unable to accede to the Finnish request because of the WNT.
Commodore von Schoultz asked if it would be possible for the Finnish government to acquire the machinery of some of the destroyers before the ratification of the Washington accords. To achieve this Schoultz asked whether the Admiralty would be prepared to sell some of those destroyers with a guarantee of breaking them up in Finland, whether the Admiralty would be prepared to sell some of the above-mentioned destroyers with a guarantee to break them up in Britain, and whether the cost of the destroyers sold with a guarantee of breaking them up in Finland or Britain would be the same as originally suggested by the British Government, i.e. £4,000 per vessel.
The Admiralty agreed to consider selling the destroyers for breaking-up if the work was done by British labour in British yards. They cited as their reasons Britain’s unemployment problems and the fact that the destroyers were ideally suited for being broken up in native yards. Neither the Admiralty nor the Foreign Office believed that the Washington Treaties precluded the sale of machinery from vessels being dismantled, and therefore these items could be sold.
The Finns kept trying. Rennie, under pressure from Dr Rudolf Holsti and other prominent Finnish officials, once again presented Finland’s situation to the Foreign Office. He attempted to lay blame for the entire debacle at Helsinki’s feet, writing that the Finns ‘should have pushed the matter more energetically in the autumn…but they let the opportunity slip’.
Holsti next proposed that the Finns approach the British and French governments, asking them as a special favour to Finland “to release His Majesty’s Government from the Washington engagement not to sell any war vessels, if the engagement was unqualified and not limited by any pending negotiations at the time it was given.” As an added incentive for British cooperation, the Finnish Minister of War mentioned that if the Finns could obtain the destroyers they also wanted British naval instructors. This appealed to Rennie. He believed he had been handed an excellent opportunity and saw the suggestion as a means of countering what the British saw as pro-German feelings among ‘certain Finnish military circles’. Rennie later expressed the fear that the pro-German faction in Finland would use the failure of the sale to cast the British in an unfavourable light.
The Finns soon broadened the scope of their plan to get a naval dispensation. They not only approached the government of France, but also contacted the representatives of Italy, Japan, and the US, asking each to grant a special exception regarding the sale of the destroyers to Finland. As they waited for the diplomatic responses, Donner, the Finnish Minister in London, asked Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office to use his influence with the Admiralty to convince them to postpone the breaking up of the destroyers. However, the Foreign Office helped derail the gambit by making it clear to their representatives in Paris, Washington, Rome, and Tokyo that the exception being sought by the Finns was not an agreeable proposition to the British government. The British believed that one such allowance would lead to many others, the result proving injurious to British policy.
As part of their plan to get around the British refusal, the Finnish Minister to Washington told the US Secretary of State that Britain would sell the destroyers if the Americans did not disagree. Obviously, this contradicted what the British had told the Finns about Great Britain’s opinion on the matter. The reasons behind the Finnish action are unclear. It could have been a misunderstanding on their part. A more likely explanation is that they purposely misrepresented the British stance in the hope of winning American support for their dilemma. Regardless it had no effect on the policy of the US. The US Secretary of State informed the Finnish that if the provisions of the naval agreement were relaxed it would become impossible to prevent similar measures in the future. This would result in the nullification of the Washington accords.
Three weeks later, Holsti told Rennie that the US had agreed to reopen negotiations on the matter if there were no objections from the French and Italian governments. Foreign Office officials speculated that Holsti’s comment arose from faulty information from Finland’s Washington officials. Donner, the Finnish Minister in London, believed that Finland’s Minister in Rome had probably misinterpreted Italian politeness as a promise that Rome would give way if Washington agreed to Finland’s request.
The Finns also related the same story on Britain’s attitude to the French that they had to the Americans, with the same lack of result. The Italians and the Japanese also agreed with the British about exceptions to the Treaty. On 23 August 1922 the Foreign Office told the Finns that all of the Allies were in agreement and that they could pursue the matter no more.