Cruisers for Brazil and Argentina
In late 1931, the Brazilian Foreign Office sent identical telegraphic instructions to its Ambassadors in Washington and London to inquire whether one or other of these governments was in a position to sell Brazil two light fast cruisers for use in protecting national interests, and for training seamen. It was intended that these two vessels would replace the obsolete battleships Minas Geraes and Sao Paulo which it was intended to scrap. Subsequent discussions on 1 December 1931 between the Brazilian Ambassador to the US and the Assistant Secretary of State related specifically to vessels of 8,400 tons capable of making 32 knots. The Admiralty understood that RN cruisers under consideration were Exeter and York, and a January 1932 Admiralty briefing paper for the British delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference mentioned that Brazil was also looking to buy ‘Leaders’ (presumably Destroyer Leaders).
The Brazilian Government was in the mistaken belief that the WNT restrictions relating to the disposal of warships to other nations only applied to vessels greater than 10,000 tons. But the relevant clause applied to any vessels of war, and it was not possible for either the US or Britain to meet the Brazilian Government’s request.
In January 1935, the Brazilian Government made a further proposal through its Ambassador to the US, that the US sell to Brazil all ten of its Omaha class cruisers, at a rate of one or two a year as these cruisers were replaced by new vessels. The first two such vessels (Omaha and Minneapolis) had been laid down in 1918, and completed in 1923, and were therefore due to become over-age in 1939. The remaining eight vessels in the class had been laid down in 1920, and would therefore not be deemed over-age until 20 years from the date of completion (i.e. 1943-45).
In February 1936 the State Department approached the US Navy Department with respect to the possibility of selling Omaha class cruisers to South American countries when they became over-age and were replaced, intimating that the State Department would be in favour of such sales.
On 19 March 1936 the Acting Secretary of State wrote that it would not be possible to comply with this proposal both because the USN would require these vessels for some years to come, and because LNT36 then pending would contain a stipulation prohibiting the disposal of naval vessels in the manner suggested.
In March 1936 the Argentine Government had cabled President Roosevelt expressing disquiet over reports that Brazil may obtain all ten of the Omaha class cruisers over a period of ten years, and then on 24 March 1936, the Argentine Ambassador approached Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, urging that if these reports were correct, the US should sell five of the ten cruisers on similar terms to Argentina, indicating that the Argentine Government would find such a solution “highly desirable as well as economical.” Welles favoured acceptance of the Argentine offer, as this would provide “the chance, which might never be repeated, to obtain unification of standards between the Argentine, Brazilian, and United States navies, and through this step, to consolidate for a long time the position we now temporarily enjoy, of having our own naval instructors in both Argentina and Brazil.” Such a move would quash British pressure both for the replacement of US naval advisors by British advisors, and for the construction of warships for Brazil and Argentina by British shipyards.
On 6 July 1936, President Roosevelt wrote to the President of Brazil advising that while Roosevelt was favourably inclined towards the Brazilian request, after the London Naval Conference it had become evident that it would not be possible for the US to relinquish any of the Omaha class cruisers within the next few years.